EXCEPTIONS TO A GENERAL
PROHIBITION ON HANDGUN
POSSESSION: DO THEY SWALLOW
UP THE RULE?
JAMES

B.

JACOBS*

I
INTRODUCTION

Current American gun law generally allows most people to own firearms,
and there are approximately 140 million guns in private possession. It is
estimated that one-third of the privately-owned firearms are handguns.' Only
members of the most unreliable social categories-drug addicts, the mentally
3
ill, convicted felons, juveniles 2-are denied permission to own firearms.
Some who decry this situation advocate "total disarmament," arguing that
everyone would be safer if no one were permitted to possess a firearm,
especially a handgun. 4 They believe that a universal right to own firearms,
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1. J. WRIGHT, P. Rossi & K. DALY, UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOI.ENCE IN
AMERICA 41-42 (1983).
2. The assumptions behind these exclusions are a subject worth pursuing, although beyond the
scope of this article. One might readily question, for example, what justifies a conclusive
presumption that any convicted felon would be an unreliable gun owner.
3. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(d), (g), (h) (1982); ALA. CODE § 13A-1 1-72, -76 (1982); ALASKA
STAT. §§ 11.61(a), .210(a), .220(a)(3) (1984); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1202, 12021.5 (West 1982); C.AL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 8100, 8103 (WEST 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.422 (West 1981).
Whether states have an administrative system to enforce these restrictions is another matter. As

of 1981, only 25 states and the District of Columbia imposed purchasing or licensing requirements.
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN, GUN CONTROL: A LOOK AT THE VARIOUS
STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS 5 (1981).
4. Man), groups concerned about handgun violence advocate a comprehensive national law to
ban the manufacture, sale, and private possession of handguns. "As long as Americans still keep

handguns under the mattress, in the closet, and in the glove compartment, none of us is safe."
NATIONAL COALITION TO BAN HANDGUNS, TWENTY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, at question 7 (1981)
(pamphlet). "The most effective way to prevent the 10,000 annual deaths by handguns would be to
outlaw the weapons entirely, or at least require that ownership be contingent upon proving need.'
Dayton (Ohio) Journal Herald, Sept. 12, 198 1, at 18, reprinted in T1E SNUBNOSED KILLERS: HANDGUNS
IN AMERICA 33, 33 (1981) (Cox Newspaper Series). "1 believe that handgung should be onl' for law
enforcement personnel and the military, period. A handgun is designed to kill people." New York
Daily News, Feb. 18, 1981, reprinted i TIlE SNUBNOSED KILLERS: HANDGUNS IN AMERICA 33. 33 (1981)
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especially handguns, makes guns more accessible to criminals and more likely
to be misused by law abiding citizens; thus, they advocate a program of
prohibition.
Many gun control skeptics have pointed out the practical difficulties of
disarming what might amount to one in four American households 5 and
suppressing a black market in new and used guns. It would be impossible to
enforce handgun prohibition against a highly resistant public; therefore, a
disarmament proposal would have to enjoy widespread support to have even
a small chance of success. Without the cooperation of gun owners and wouldbe owners, gun prohibition would be no more successful than alcohol
prohibition, perhaps less so. 6 Reducing the stockpile of firearms in private
hands depends upon changing public perceptions about the necessity and
desirability of owning and carrying firearms. The thesis of this article is that
gun control proposals that allow for large numbers of individuals and groups
to retain their weapons will not encourage voluntary and cooperative
disarmament by nonexempt individuals and groups. To the contrary,
politically expedient gun control proposals, rife with exemptions, will be
viewed cynically and hostilely. In fact, such proposals legitimate the value of
gun possession for persons and groups with "good reasons" for possessing
firearms. This article seeks to understand why gun control proposals
categorically exempt any groups. Is there more than political expediency at
work?
Most gun control proposals put forward in the last few years are not likely
to be perceived as fair because they explicitly and implicitly recognize the
value and importance of gun ownership by carving out gaping exceptions to a
general gun prohibition. Close examination reveals that many prohibitionists
are not advocating "total disarmament." To begin with, practically all
"control" scenarios seek to prohibit only "handguns," leaving people free to
own rifles, shotguns, and other long guns. Some scenarios would ban only
"Saturday Night Specials, ' 7 leaving people free to own more expensive and
powerful handguns as well as long guns. Nor do handgun-only
prohibitionists mean to eliminate all handgun ownership; exceptions are
invariably made for persons judged to have good reasons for owning or carrying
(Cox Newspaper Series) (quoting Charles Moore, Assistant FBI Director in charge of the criminal
investigative division).
5. See, e.g., Moore, The Bird in Hand, 2 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 185-95 (1983).
6.

For an informative account of the national prohibition, seeJ. KOBLER, ARDENT SPIRITS: THE

(1973).
7. It is no easy matter to define or identify a "Saturday Night Special." The term is not a term
of art, but rather an ambiguous reference to cheap handguns:
"Saturday Night Special," a phrase coined in Detroit to describe inexpensive handguns used to
commit murder, robberies, and other crimes during weekend outbursts of violence, has many
definitions. Some define it as a small handgun, others as an inexpensive handgun, and still
others as an inexpensive and low quality handgun, with "low quality" often measured by (he
melting temperature of the firearm's metal parts. The most commonly accepted definition o)f the
weapon seems to focus on its low cost and low quality, while the majority of proposals in
Congress using the term focus on the combined factors of size. quality, and cost in that order of
priority.
RISE AND FALL OF NATIONAL PROHIBITION
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handguns. Police, private security guards, private investigators, business
persons, and selected individuals are typically exempted from handgun bans.
These categorical exceptions raise profound and politically volatile equity
concerns. As more people fall within the exceptions, there is less moral force
behind the prohibition; the exceptions reinforce the apparently widely held
feeling that handguns are valuable, even necessary, for personal security.
Even a small number of broad exceptions might discourage people from
voluntarily discarding their handguns, or from cooperating with a prohibition
law.
Analysis of the exceptions that survive handgun prohibition has several
useful functions. First, it clarifies to what extent general "prohibition" with
exceptions differs from free availability with exclusions. Second, it
demonstrates how susceptible exceptions are to controversy and conflict.
Third, it shows the difficulty of preventing exceptions from swallowing up a
general prohibition. Fourth, it focuses attention on basic policy issues: Who
should be allowed to possess or carry various sorts of firearms and why? Fifth,
and most importantly, it invites consideration of the relationship between a
police firearms policy and a general firearms policy. If the police showed
leadership in disarming or "de-arming" themselves, more private citizens,
including gun owners, might view firearms as unnecessary in their own lives.
Part II of this article examines two recent handgun control ordinances in
order to identify exceptions to handgun prohibition in the context of actual
legislation. Part III seeks to identify the justifications for recognizing any
exceptions, and argues that only if these justifications are very limited could
gun prohibition be perceived as morally coherent and politically conceivable.
II
RECENT HANDGUN BANS AND THEIR EXCEPTIONS

In 1981 and 1982, gun bans in San Francisco, California and Morton
Grove, Illinois drew a good deal of national attention. These ordinances were
hailed as victories in the battle to prohibit handguns. Yet close inspection
reveals that neither of these ordinances is a "total prohibition"; both permit
many people to keep a firearm at home or at work.
S. BRILL, FIREARM ABUSE: A RESEARCH AND POLICY REPORT 48 n.6 (197

7

); see also Cook, Ve "'Saturday

Night Special'" An Assessment of Alternative Definitions fromt a Pollw Perspective, 72 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1735 (1981).
A Maryland court recently held in products liability litigation that manufacturers of "Saturday
Night Specials" could be held strictly liable for injuries resulting from such weapons' use. Kelley v.
R.G. Industries, Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985). In reaching this holding, the court noted:
There is no clear-cut, established definition of a Saturday Night Special, although there are
various characteristics which are considered in placing a handgun into that category. Relevant
factors include the gun's barrel length, concealability, cost, quality of materials. quality of
manufacturer, accuracy, reliability, whether it has been banned from import by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and other related characteristics .... Because many of these
factors are relative, in a tort suit a handgun should rarely, if ever. be deemed a Saturday Night
Special as a matter of law. Instead, it is a finding to be made by the trier of facts.
Id. at 1159-60.
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The San Francisco Handgun Control Ordinance

San Francisco's controversial Handgun Control Ordinance was a response
to the assassination of the mayor and a city councilman. A California
appellate court struck the ordinance down on statutory grounds before it was
to go into effect." For present purposes, however, the ordinance provides a
valuable example of the type of gun control thought socially desirable and
politically achievable in contemporary American society and the kinds of
exemptions that are likely to arise under legislation prohibiting handgun
ownership.
The San Francisco ordinance begins as if it were a flat prohibition: "It
shall be unlawful for any person to possess, within the City and County of San
Francisco, any handgun." 9 This tough language sounds like a total
prohibition, but it leaves a vast amount of weapons possession undisturbed.
Like many gun control schemes, the San Francisco ordinance applies only
to handguns. Two-thirds of all civilian owned firearms are thereby
legitimated. This handgun-only ban reflects a common and reasonable
judgment that handguns pose a different, more serious, problem than long
guns, no doubt because they can be concealed and deployed in surprise
attacks. Still, the long gun exemption blows a massive hole in the "control"
scenario.
Turning again to the San Francisco ordinance, there are ten exemptions
from the prohibitory norm which together allow for the survival of extensive
handgun ownership:
(A)
(B)

Public law enforcement personnel;
Military personnel while employed in the performance of their duties;

(C)
(D)

Those using handguns on target ranges;
Those transporting target shooting handguns;

(E) Licensed Collectors;
(F) Those who qualify for licenses to carry concealed weapons, and licensed
handgun sellers;
(G) Armored vehicle guards who have obtained a Firearms Qualification card;
(H) Patrol special police officers, assistant patrol special police officers, animal
control officers or zookeepers, humane officers authorized under § 607f, and harbor
police;
(I) Guards or messengers of common carriers, banks, and other financial
institutions engaged in the course of their duties; guards of contract carriers operating
armored vehicles; private investigators, private patrol operators, and alarm company
operators; uniformed security guards or night guards employed by any public agency;
uniformed security guards, regularly employed and compensated as such by persons
employed in any lawful business;

8. Doe v.City & County of San Francisco, 136 Cal. App. 3d 509, 186 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1982); 65
Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 457 (1982). The Court in Doe held that the legislature preempted the field of
licensing and regulating handguns by virtue of Government Code § 53071. 136 Cal. App. 3d at 51518, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 383-85. Since the state has occupied the field, an ordinance that requires a
larger class of citizens to seek a discretionary license in order to keep their handguns (Penal Code
§ 12050) is invalid as a licensing ordinance. Id.
9. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE pt. II, ch. VIII, art. 35, § 3503 (1982).
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(J) Any person engaged in any lawful business, or any officer, employee, or agent
authorized by such person for lawful purposes connected with such business,
possessing a handgun within such person's fixed place of business. 10

Most of what the ordinance's bold opening pronouncement takes away is
given back by its exceptions. The public law enforcement exception (A)
includes several dozen categories of personnel, such as district attorneys'
investigators, alcoholic beverage control officers, investigators for the
Department of Professional and Vocational Standards, forest and fire
wardens, University of California police, food and drug inspectors, park
rangers, and prison guards. I
In short, this exception goes far beyond
10. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE pt. II, ch. VIII, art. 35, § 3507(A)-(J) (1982) (the
provisions of the ordinance have been paraphrased here).
11. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE pt. II ch. VIII, art. 35, § 3507(a) (1982) exempts:
Peace officers listed in Sections 830.1, 830.2, 830.3, 830.31, 830.4, 830.5, and 830.6 of the Penal
Code whether active or honorably retired, other duly appointed peace officers, full-time paid
peace officers of other states and the federal government who are carrying out official duties
while in California, or any person summoned by any such officers to assist in making arrests or
preserving the peace while such person is actively engaged in assisting such officer.
Peace officers exempted under the applicable California Penal Code sections include: the police
of a city or other district permitted by statute to maintain a police force, constables and deputy
constables regularly employed and paid by a judicial district, sheriffs, undersheriffs and deputy
sheriffs regularly employed and paid as such, marshals and deputy marshals of a municipal court,
inspectors and investigators regularly employed and paid as such by a district attorney's office, the
Deputy Director, assistant directors, assistant chiefs, special agents and narcotics agents of the
Department ofJustice who are designated as peace officers by the Attorney General under § 830.1;
members of the California Highway Patrol whose primary duty is the enforcement of the Vehicle
Code and other laws relating to the highways, members of the California State Police Division whose
primary duty is the protection of state property and the occupants thereof, members of the California
National Guard called into active duty, serving where military assistance is required and directly
assisting civil authorities where specified by statute, members of the California State University and
College Police department whose duties involved enforcement of the law as specified by statute,
members of the Law Enforcement Liaison Unit of the Department of Corrections whose duty is the
investigation, apprehension, and transportation of parolees, parole violators, or escapees, or the
coordination of such activities with other agencies, members of the Wildlife Protection Branch of the
Department of Fish and Game whose primary duty is the enforcement of the law as provided by
statute, members of the Department of Parks and Recreation designated by the director whose
primary duty is the enforcement of the law as specified by statute, and employees of the Department
of Forestry designated by the director tinder § 830.2; law enforcement personnel regularly employed
by the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control for the enforcement of laws relating to alcoholic
beverages designated by the Director of Alcoholic Beverage Control, persons employed by the
Division of Investigation of the Department of Consumer Affairs and investigators of the Board of
Medical Quality Assurance, the Board of Dental Examiners, the Department of Motor Vehicles, and
the California Horse Racing Board who are designated as investigators, the State Fire Marshal, the
Food and Drug Section employed as investigators, the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement
employed as investigators, the State Departments of Health Services, Social Services, Mental Health,
Developmental Services and Alcohol and Drug Programs and the Office of Statewide Planning and
Development, the Bureau of Fraudulent Claims of the Department of Insurance, including the chief
and investigators, and the Department of Housing and Community Development under § 830.3:
arson investigators, park rangers, community college police departments. welfare fraud investigators
and inspectors, child support investigators, coroners and deputy coroners, members of the San
Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District Police Department, harbor and port police, and security
officers designated by a municipal district under § 830.31; security officers of the California State
Police Division, the Sergeant of Arms of each house of the Legislature, bailiffs of the Supreme Court
and of the courts of appeal, guards and messengers of the Treasurer's office, officers designated b%
the hospital administrator of a state hospital tinder the jurisdiction of the State Department of Mental
Health or the State Department of Developmental Services, railroad policemen commissioned by the
Governor, members of a police department of a school district, Security Officers of the County of
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permitting "the police" to retain their handguns; the privilege is extended to
almost anyone connected with the criminal justice system, whether or not in
front line law enforcement positions. Even these agencies' retirees are
erltitled to retain their handguns! 12 Sheriffs and police chiefs retain
unfettered discretion to permit private citizens to carry concealed handguns
"upon proof that the person applying is of good moral character, that good
cause exists for the issuance, and that the person applying is a resident of the
county."' 3 There is no way of knowing how hundreds of police officials
interpret "good moral character" and "good cause."' 14
Sections (I) and (J) of San Francisco's Handgun Control Ordinance
exempt the greatest number of handgun owners. Section (I) allows most
private security personnel to possess handguns. Subsection (I)(1)(7)
authorizes armored vehicle guards to carry weapons, provided that they pass a
brief firearms training course.' 5 Another subsection allows "uniformed
security guards, regularly employed and compensated as such by persons
engaged in any lawful business" to possess handguns on business premises. 16
Los Angeles, housing authority patrol officers, transit police officers, and airport law enforcement
officers under § 830.4; corrections, probation, and parole officers under § 830.5; and persons
deputized or otherwise appointed as reserve or auxiliary sheriffs or as policemen, deputy sheriffs, or
reserve officers of a regional park district, or deputies of the Department of Fish and Game under
§ 830.6.
Peace officers appointed under §§ 830.3 through 830.5 may carry firearms only if permitted by
their employing agencies.
12. See SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE pt. II, ch. VIII, art. 35, § 3507(A)(1). Under state
law, however, the only duly retired peace officers exempt from the concealed weapons violation
statute are those employed under §§ 830.1 and 830.2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12027(a) (West 1982).
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12050 (West 1982). In Salute v. Pitches, 61 Cal. App. 3d 557, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 345 (1976), the court held that the fixed policy of denying permits under Penal Code § 12050
constituted an abuse of discretion. 61 Cal. App. 3d at 560, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 347. Apparently officials
in San Francisco and Los Angeles still refuse all applications to carry concealed weapons. There are
no more than 20 such permits in San Francisco. San Francisco Examiner, June 6, 1983, at B2, col. 4.
Statements by the San Francisco police chief suggested, however, that this policy would be relaxed
under a handgun ban.
14. This type of "good cause" scheme is not unique. New York law authorizes judges and police
officials to grant possession and carry permits to applicants who can demonstrate "good moral
character" and "concerning whom no good cause exists for the denial of the license." N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 400.00(l) (McKinney 1980). In spite of the wording, which seems to presume a liberal
approach to awarding licenses, the statute is administered with a heavy presumption against
licensing. Case-by-case licensing does not require explicit decisions concerning the priority of
different claims. Such judgments are invisible. The result might be less political controversy
(assuming generosity in granting permits) because invisible decisionmaking is harder to attack on the
merits. On the other hand, such open-ended discretion is vulnerable to arbitrariness, discrimination,
and erratic implementation.
15. Armored vehicle guards must obtain a Firearms Qualifications Card from the Department of
Consumer Affairs in order to possess a handgun. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUNICIPAl. CODE pt. II. ch.
VIII, art. 35, § 3507(G) (1982). Uniformed security guards, patrol operators and their employees,
private investigators and their employees, and guards and messengers of financial institutions must
be issued a certificate pursuant to § 12033 of the California Penal Code. Id. § 3507(1)(l)-(6). The
certificate can be obtained by completing "a course in the carrying and use of firearms and a course
of training in the exercise of the powers of arrest" offered by any school. The courses must "meet
the standards prescribed by the department" of Consumer Affairs. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12033 (West
Supp. 1984).
16. SAN FRANCISCO, CAl.., MUNICIPAL CODE pt. II, ch. VIII, art. 35, § 3507(I)(5) (1982).
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Section (J) is even broader: it permits handgun possession by "any person
engaged in any lawful business, including a nonprofit organization, or any
officer, employee, or agent authorized by such person for lawful purposes
connected with such business, possessing a handgun within such person's
fixed place of business."' 7 In other words, any legitimate business person or
designated employees may go armed on business premises. The ordinance
does not require a firearms training course.18
To summarize, the San Francisco Handgun Control Law imposes no
restrictions on possession of long guns. It permits handgun possession by
active and retired law enforcement personnel, uniformed private security

guards, private investigators, business persons (broadly defined) and their
employees, and various others. Only private citizens in their residential roles

are denied handguns, unless they can obtain permits to carry concealed
weapons. On reflection, what is most remarkable about the ordinance is not
its bold disarmament initiative, but its recognition of so many instances of

firearms possession as inevitable and perhaps justifiable.
B.

The Morton Grove Ordinance

One year before the San Francisco ordinance was passed, Morton Grove, a
Chicago suburb, also passed a gun control ordinance.' 9 The impetus for the
ordinance was an application to open a gun shop in the community. 2 0 Like its

San Francisco counterpart, Morton Grove's law received a good deal of
national publicity. Unlike the San Francisco law, however, this ordinance
survived legal assaults in the state and federal courts. 2 ' While it purports to
17.

Id. § 3507U).

18. Neither section (J) nor the mandatory jail sentence for illegal 'possession of a handgun was
part of the ordinance as originally proposed. Carol Ruth Silver, a member of the Board of
Supervisors and a critic of handgun bans, put forward an alternative ordinance prohibiting
possession of stolen firearms and firearms in bars or while under the influence of alcohol, and
recommended that state and federal officials enact mandatory minimum sentences with no plea
bargaining or concurrent sentencing for convicted felons illegally possessing firearms. This proposal
would have made possession of a firearm without a permit (to be given to any "responsible, lawabiding adult") a felony, required a 72-hour cooling-off period before a purchaser could obtain a
firearm, made selling a firearm to any person who did not show a permit or supporting identification
a felony, imposed civil liability upon sellers of firearms who did not ask to see a permit or
identification or abide by the cooling-off period should any loss or injury occur, and imposed civil
liability upon parents whose unsupervised children misused their parents' firearms. The ordinance
also would have established minimum mandatory sentences for theft, fencing, or possession of stolen
firearms, for illegal carrying of concealed firearms, and carrying firearms in a bar or while under the
influence of alcohol. It also would have established programs to teach the public how safely to store
and use firearms.
Apparently, the Board of Supervisors was partially persuaded. The ordinance which ultimately
passed allowed private citizens in their professional, but not residential, roles to possess handguns:
illegal possession was made punishable by imposition of a mandatory jail sentence. See C. SILVER.
1982) (prepared for San Francisco Board of
HANDGUN CONTROLS BRIEFING BOOK (May 11,
Supervisors).
19.

MORTON GROVE, ILL., CODE § 132.102(E)(l)-(10) (1981).

20. Telephone interview with Martin Ashman, Corporation Counsel for Morton Grove, Illinois
(July 25, 1983).
21. See Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cerl. denied. 464 U.S. 863
(1983); Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 113 Il1. App. 3d 488, 447 N.E.2d 848 (1983). afl-d.
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proscribe possession of handguns within village limits, it also establishes a
number of important exceptions:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Peace Officers;
Wardens and other jail and penitentiary personnel;
Members of the active and reserve armed forces, and National Guard;

(4) Special Agents employed by a railroad or a public utility to perform police
functions; guards of armored car companies; watchmen and security guards actually
and regularly employed in the commercial or industrial operation for the protection of
persons employed and private property related to such commercial or industrial
operation;
(5) Agents of the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission;
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

Licensed gun collectors;
Licensed gun clubs;
Those possessing antique firearms;
Those transporting handguns to persons authorized to possess them;
22
Those transporting handguns from one gun club to another.

The first and fourth exceptions are the broadest. Since "peace officer" is
not defined by the ordinance, the definition in the Illinois code is applicable:
"Any person who by virtue of his office or public employment is vested by law
with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for offenses whether
the duty extends to all offenses or is limited to specific offenses." '2 3 This
definition covers all types of "police forces," including, for example, college
and university police forces, security guards for public institutions, and law
enforcement officers of state agencies.2 4 The state courts have broadly
construed "peace officer" to include any employee of a public entity
25
responsible for maintaining public order.
Prison and jail officers, who do not qualify for peace officer status because
they have no general powers of arrest or order maintenance, are allowed to
carry concealed weapons while performing some duties and while commuting
to and from work. 26 This exception is curious because guards do not carry
103 Ill.
2d 483, 470 N.E.2d 266 (1984). Unlike the California court in Doe v. City & County of San
Francisco, 136 Cal. App. 3d 509, 186 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1982), the Illinois state and federal courts
found that under state law the issue had not been preempted. Illinois law establishes a presumption
in favor of municipal home rule. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d at 267-68. The
Morton Grove ordinance also passed state and federal constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 265-67.
22. MORTON GROVE, ILL., CODE § 132.102(E)(1)-(10) (1981).
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-13 (1973).
24. See, e.g., Evans v. Rewers, 595 F.2d 372, 373-74 (7th Cir. 1979) (county hospital security
guards are peace officers, but only " 'upon premises operated by the Governing Commission and
when required for the protection of such premises, personnel, students, patients and properties
thereof' ") (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 910 (1973)); People v. Picha, 44 IlI. App. 3d 759, 762,
358 N.E.2d 937, 939 (1976) (Southern Illinois University Police Department members are peace
officers "[wjithin their defined jurisdiction and subject to certain limitations"); 1981 III. Op. Att'v
Gen. 89 (certain Department of Revenue fraud agents are peace officers); 1980 III. Op. Att'v Gen. 73
(University of Illinois police are peace officers, but only when protecting university properties or
interests, unless specifically requested otherwise by the appropriate county sheriff).
25. If an employee of a public entity is responsible for maintaining public order, he or she is a
peace officer. Peace officer status may extend to all times and all places in the state, or may be
limited to a specific time and place. See People v.Bouse, 46 II. App. 3d 465, 471, 360 N.E.2d 1340,
1344 (1977) (police officers are peace officers at all times, whether in or out of uniform).
26. MORTON GROVE, ILL., CODE § 132.102(F)(2) (1981).
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firearms on the job, except for rifles and shotguns held by those posted in
towers.
The fourth exception permits all types of private security guards to
possess weapons. In addition to special agents of railroads and utilities, and
employees of armored car companies (e.g., Brinks, Wackenhut), all those who
guard commercial property are entitled to possess guns and to carry them on
the job. 2 7 Presumably, they may transport their weapons to and from work.
Unlike the San Francisco ordinance, the Morton Grove law does not
provide an exception for business persons carrying handguns on business
premises. In the final analysis, however, Morton Grove, like San Francisco,
gave its approval to an enormous amount of gun ownership. Such approval
gives ammunition to members of excluded groups who are likely to view
themselves as equally worthy of an exemption as all those who have been
exempted.

28

III
THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF HANDGUN PROHIBITION EXCEPTIONS

Even purportedly strict handgun control laws would leave long guns
untouched and large numbers of people free to possess handguns at home
and at work. Those with guns at work may be entitled to commute with their
weapons. A smaller number of people are permitted to carry handguns at all
times. What justifies these exceptions?
A.

Long Guns

Because long guns are more difficult to conceal, they may be less
deployable for some kinds of crimes, like street robberies. They can be (and
are) used to commit crimes and "settle arguments," however, and if
accidently discharged they can cause great damage or death. They are much
more deadly than handguns. A handgun-only prohibition would lead some
handgun owners and would-be owners to replace their handguns with much
more powerful rifles and shotguns. Whether more long guns and fewer
handguns would reduce gun violence depends upon how many and what
types of handgun owners make the switch to long guns. It is tempting to
conclude that the exemption of long guns from proposals for firearms
prohibition primarily reflects a judgment about political reality. Long gun
owners are a much more powerful political group than handgun owners
(although many owners possess both types of weapons). The fact that long
27. Id. § 132.102(E)(4).
28. In fact. the plaintiffs in Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Il.2d 483. 470 N.E.2d
266 (1984), did make this argument. The Illinois Supreme Court observed that -iln related
contentions, [the plaintiffs] argue that the ordinance, through its exemptions, arbitrarily
discriminates between residents of the village in violation of equal protection guarantees .... .- I.
at 494, 470 N.E.2d at 277. The court upheld the law. Because the state right to bear arms is not
fundamental, the ordinance need only have a rational basis to withstand constitutional equal
protection scrutiny.
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guns are used for hunting also gives them a "legitimate" purpose that handguns (in the eyes of many) do not have.
B.

The Peace Officer Exception

The exception to general handgun prohibition that enjoys the greatest
consensus is the exception made for "the police." 29 Even fervent advocates
of handgun control (including police themselves) concede that under
stringent handgun control the police will continue to possess and carry
handguns.30 This concession should not go unquestioned. It may well turn
out that there is a relationship between arming the police and arming the
3
general citizenry. i
Curiously, gun control advocates have not urged the police to give up their
handguns in order to achieve a complete prohibition. If even the police (or
some portion of them) were denied handguns, the force of the prohibitory
norm would be very strong indeed. A society that denied, seriously limited,
or even seriously questioned the need for police handguns would be
unquestionably committed to eliminating this weaponry.
To speak of "disarming" the police of their handguns does not convey any
indication as to what weapons the police would be allowed instead. Just like
civilians, the police might arm themselves with rifles or shotguns under a
handgun-only prohibition. Would that be desirable? The answer depends
upon the comparative advantages and disadvantages of these high-powered
29. For a brief history of police firearms policies, see Morn, Firearms Use and the Police: A Historic
Evolution of American Values, in FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 489 (D. Kates ed.
1984) [hereinafter cited as FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE]. Morn argues that an armed police emerged in
the second half of the 19th century as a response to increased use of firearms by criminals. Id. at 50012.
30. The National Coalition to Ban Handguns recognizes that even under a "ban," law
enforcement personnel will keep their handguns. "A ban on the private possession of handguns
does not mean that no one may own a firearm . . . . The police and other law enforcement officials
will still have access to any firearms they need, including handguns." NATIONAL COALITION TO BAN
HANDGUNS, supra note 4, at question 13.
31. Cf D. BAYLEY, FORCES OF ORDER: POLICE BEHAVIOR IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 160
(1979):
It is clearly unrealistic to expect any police force to disarm if the populace at large is allowed to
possess substantial quantities of firearms. At the same time, willingness of the police to use
firearms may affect the way guns are viewed by society. Specifically, the fact that police accept
the inevitability of armed confrontations with offenders may reduce pressure for more stringent
gun control laws. Consider, for instance, what would happen if American police officials publicly
announced their commitment to strict gun control legislation and then announced they would
disarm themselves as an example of how safe society is most of the time. The immediate
reaction, of course, would be astonishment and incredulity. The long run effect would be to
make the killing of policemen wanton acts. If policemen were unarmed and then killed, the
implicit norms of fairness would be violated. They wouldn't have a chance. The public would
have a greater difficulty than now in denying responsibility for protecting police officers.
Support for strict enforcement of penalties against guns in crime would stiffen, as would
pressure for hand gun control legislation. Guns in police hands and guns in private hands are
related. But there is more symmetry in the relationship than is usually recognized. The police
will feel compelled to be armed as long as much of the populace is. But the populace may not
limit arms ownership without persistent encouragement from the police, especially willingness
to sacrifice some of the appearance of self reliance. The police probably possess more initiative
than they are willing to exercise.

Page 5: Winter 1986]

GENERAL HANDGUN

PROHIBITION

weapons. They might well be too unwieldy for effective deployment in many
police encounters; whenever they are fired, the chance of death or serious
injury is greater than when handguns are used. It is conceivable, however,
that their greater firepower would better deter criminal violence and attacks
on police, thus producing fewer fired shots.
Instead of "trading up," the police could be forced to "trade down," and
make do with rubber or plastic bullets, tasers or stun guns, or blackjacks and
mace.3 2 It seems extraordinary that there has been so little thinking about
and experimentation with weapons other than the traditional handgun.
Creative experiments in "arming down" might contribute to a social and
political environment in which civilian gun ownership would lose some of its
attraction.
Whether or not prohibiting police handguns is politically conceivable,
virtually all handgun prohibition proposals, like the San Francisco and
Morton Grove ordinances, exempt the police. Why? Surprisingly little
attention has been given to this question. Illuminating the reasons for the
police exemption might be of assistance in discerning the core rationale that
justifies or defeats other claims for exemptions from handgun prohibition. In
other words, why should the police be armed and the general citizenry or
various discrete groups of citizens be disarmed? Four plausible reasons are:
1) personal safety; 2) arrest powers; 3) deterrence of crime; and 4) superior
training and judgment.
1. Personal Safety. The extent to which personal safety justifies handgun
ownership is central to the handgun controversy, since many persons own
handguns in order to defend themselves. If self-defense provides the crucial
justification for permitting police to carry guns, why does personal security
not justify handguns for everyone? Are the police in greater danger than
other citizens? Are firearms a more effective and appropriate means of selfdefense for police than for other citizens? Are private citizens better situated
than police officers to absorb the risks of unarmed self-defense? Are the
"costs" of police firearms less than the "costs" of civilian firearms?
It is true that an unarmed police officer might be at the mercy of an
offender armed with a gun (knife, tire iron, etc.), but so too might an unarmed
store owner, apartment dweller, or pedestrian.:33 The police officer is likely to
32. Stun guns are small battery-operated devices with two electrodes at one end. When pressed
against a person's body or clothing, they release an electric charge that cattses temporary loss of
neuromusti lar coIl'ol and collapse. The laser is similar to a stun gur. It shoots two darts attached
to, long wires; when the darts strike the target's body. the shock is administered.
33.
hIle po0 el ItIial el lect iveitess of gun cot rI laws in keeping hanidgi ins away froni crimi nals has
cxcited a good deal of cttir,,versy. For a discussion f'prollents associated with tie enfirceitent of'
gttn cntrIol laws againsl criminals, see Cook & Blose, State ProglrsIo r Srieening landgun Btyrrs. 455
h'lle
ANNAI.S 80 (1981); Moore. KeepinA' landgouns frm Crintinal Of/'iiders, 455 ANNAILS 92 (1981).
problems involved ill reducing the stock of handgits in the general population are .surveyed in
Kales, Handgun Bannig ii Light qthe PIrohibitionE'xpI~erienc', itl FIREARMS AND VIOI.ENCF., s/fn/ Iote 29.
i.!.. 13 1
at 139; Kessler. Eu,,toreemeotl Irblems o( G mContrl: A I n'dtliless ('rins ..Inalysiso. 16 (RIM. I..
(1980). If criminals responded to a landgun hall by sttbstiltiting sawed-oil" shoitttis and rifles for
handguns, the restt might be a larger number of ffitalities. See Hardy & Kates. landgutn .Iilability
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come into contact with dangerous offenders more frequently than most, but
not all, private citizens, some of whom live in dangerous neighborhoods (and
public housing projects) where they are highly vulnerable to attack. 3 4
Arguably, the police officer has fewer self-defense options than the private
citizen, because the officer cannot avoid dangerous areas, streets, and taverns,
and cannot flee from potential assailants. There is some force to this point,
but only some. Many private citizens, among them the elderly, poor, weak
and powerless, lack realistic options for avoiding attacks and defending
themselves. Some of these people could plausibly claim that the state has
created their vulnerability by its maladministration of public housing or public
35
transportation and by its ineffective criminal justice system.
aid the Social Harm of Robbery: Recent Data and Some Projections, in RESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE;
LIBERAL SKEPrICS SPEAK OUT 126-29 (D. Kates ed. 1979); Kleck, Handgun Only Gn Control: .- Policly
Disastei in the Aloking, in FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE, supra note 29, at 171-76.
For study reports and critiques that measure the efficacy of handgun controls in reducing violent
crine. see Hardy, Firearm Ownership and Regulation: Tackling an Old Problem with Renewed Vigor, 20 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 235 (1978) (critiquing criminal armament studies as well as ownership surveys and
programs aimed at eliminating criminal gun use); Jones, The District of Columbia's "Firearms Control
Regulations Act of 1975": The Toughest Handgun Control Law in the United States-Or Is It?, 455 ANNALS
138 (1981) (critique of United States Conference of Mayors' assessment); Pierce & Bowers, The
Bartle -Fox Gon Law's Short-Term Impact on Crime in Boston, 455 ANNALS 120 (1981). The inefficacy of
current handgun bans illustrates a crucial point: it would be virtually impossible to confiscate
handguns owned by criminals, even under a universal ban.
34. In a recent New York gun possession case, the defendant, a 53-year-old "law-abiding
citizen," had lived for 17 years in a city-owned housing project in the Bronx, a neighborhood which
had become increasingly dangerous and crime-ridden. He testified that he had purchased an out-ofstate gun in response to the "litany of terror" that his family had lived through as a result of attacks
on them and their home. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for
criminal possession in the third degree "in the interest ofjustice." People v. Hamilton, N.Y.L.J., Jan.
30, 1985. at 7, col. 3, 11, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 1985).
35. Perhaps this line of inquiry proves too much. Does it not suggest that the self-defense
rationale should expand the opportunity for citizens in good standing to carry handguns for selfprotection? Is there any reason to think that the average citizen is less vulnerable on the streets or in
the subways than at home? One should not so easily dismiss the fears of men and women who have
to commute to work in dangerous neighborhoods. If the point is to maximize safety, why should the
individual not be permitted to carry a concealed or visible handgun on his or her person, like a police
officer?
The argument for prohibiting people from carrying weapons on the streets is far stronger than
the argument for prohibiting possession of handguns. A home weapon is primarily defensive, and
tile circle of those who can be injured by its misuse is narrowly circumscribed. Of course, weapons
purchased fot "home use" can and will be carried outside the home by some portion of owners. A
weapon carried in public may deter attacks, if it is seen or suspected, but in case of a surprise attack,
the handgun may be of little or no assistance, even to a police officer. More important. a gun carried
in public can also be used oflensively to commit crimes. A handgun can be deployed very quickly to
rob a pedestrian or a store clerk, or to kill any civilian or police officer. Social life wvould be
enormously insecure if cveryone carried a firearm at all times. As a consequence, there is a strong
societal interest in liniiting as much as possible the number of people who are allowed to carry a
handgun in public.
The right to carry a weapon in public, sometimes concealed, has already been extended beyond
the public police. Some private security officers, like iniversity police, regularly carry weapons, as do
some probation officers, parole officers, and court personnel. Private security guards who are
authorized to carry weapons at work frequently carry their weapons off duty, since there is no place
to store them on the job, or merely because they like to carry a gun. This means that they max
frequently be armed in public. Influential persons are able to obtain carry permits for thenselves or
their bodyguards tnder criteria of special need or good cause.
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On the other hand, the police officer might argue that his or her claim to
bear arms is especially compelling because the state creates the officer's
vulnerability by organizing a public agency charged with keeping the peace
and enforcing the laws-hazardous activities to be sure. The handgun might
be for the police officer what protective goggles are for the welder.3 1i Even so,
asking police officers to assume greater risks than ordinary citizens is morally
permissible. The police cannot be protected against all risks. They cannot be
encapsuled in bulletproof bubbles and made invulnerable to snipers, maniacs,
and drunk drivers. Fortunately, gun attacks on police officers are still rare,
even in big cities. In addition, it is not totally far-fetched to hypothesize that
some gun attacks may occur precisely because police project an aggressive
armed presence. A significant number of police officers each year mistakenly7
shoot other police officers, and some are victims of their own gun accidents.
Prison and jail guards work unarmed every day among men proven to be
violent and dangerous, some of whom are either "lifers" or very long-term
prisoners with little to fear from new criminal charges. In a typical exercise
yard or cell block a guard vastly outnumbered could be stabbed, bludgeoned,
strangled, or otherwise eliminated at any time; yet there is no move to arm jail
and prison guards. It seems odd that so much attention is paid to minimizing
the risk of attacks on police, but not on prison officers.
The police are surely in a much better position than civilians to develop
alternative protective technologies and strategies. While the future of police
weaponry is beyond the scope of this article, the police are well positioned to
experiment with all sorts of nonlethal weapons, to outfit themselves in
bulletproof clothing, and to train themselves in martial arts. Even without any
developments along these lines, an unarmed police officer is probably more
adept at self-protection than a private citizen because he or she is likely to be
better trained in self-defense, to carry a night stick, chemical mace, and other
weapons, to travel with another officer, to have recourse to reinforcements,
and to be alert to potential trouble. In deterring assaults, the officer can rely
upon the state's moral authority and the widely shared knowledge that
prosecutors and courts regard assaults on police officers more seriously than
Why, then, should the police officer be
assaults on private citizens.
'1

36. See. e.g., Oakland Police Ofleers Ass'n v. City of Oakland, 30 Cal. App. 3d 96, 100-01, 106
Cal. Rptr. 134, 138 (1973) (there is a legislative duty on the part of the city to provide police officers
with "safety equipment," including a service revolver). The court in Oakland Police Officers said, "the
fact that the gunLprotects the officer's life does not make it less important as a safety device than the
It is unthinkable that a local governiment agency would require
goggles which guard a workman's eves ....
d. at 100-0 1, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 138 (emphasis
or pernit its tyficers to go onto the sheets withont guns."
added). But see D. BAYLEv, sipra note 3 1, at 172 ("When the police [in Japani deploy to handle riots
and demonstrations they deliberately disarm themselves. Rather than breaking otit new and more
deadly forms of weaponry, as American police do, they take off their pistols and leave them at the
police station.").
Chicago Police: U'uconmion Clises, Part II: Shootilgs of
37. See Geller & Karales, Shootings of ad h11y
Police. Shooting Correlates and Contiol Strategies, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGv 33 1, 332 (1982).
38. Indeed, in many jurisdictions assaulting a law enforcement officer is an aggravated form of
assaUlt. E.g., CxL. PENAI. CoDE § 243 (West Supp. 1984).
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permitted to carry a handgun, but the private citizen be prohibited, perhaps
on pain of imprisonment, from even keeping a handgun in his home?
In sum, advocates of handgun prohibition cannot justify an exception for
the police on self-defense or safety grounds without letting loose tremendous
pressure to recognize other self-defense and safety claims that could
ultimately swallow up the prohibition.
2. Arrest Powers. The police are authorized to arrest when they have
probable cause to believe an individual has committed an offense. To take an
offender into custody the police arguably need special powers. Perhaps the
need to make arrests, more than a special need for self-protection,
distinguishes the police officer from the private citizen.M- Does the authority
and responsibility to make arrests support a special claim to carry firearms? If
so, this is a much narrower justification than safety and security, and one that
might distinguish the police from other citizens wishing to possess firearms.
Proof is lacking, however, on the extent to which police officers do need
handguns in order to take suspects into custody. 41 Americans, accustomed as
they are to a thoroughly and continuously armed police (and to constant
television and movie depictions of shootouts), may find it hard to imagine that
police could carry out their duties without handguns. 4 1 In part, this difficulty
is because the popular image of "the police" is shaped by those who patrol
the toughest areas of America's largest cities, precisely the officers who have
the most need to be armed. Tens of thousands of officers work in rural and
suburban environments far less dangerous than the violence-ridden
neighborhoods of large cities. It is hard to believe that the need to make
arrests could justify arming all of these personnel at all times on all
assignments. Some officers have duties that never bring them into
confrontational situations; for them a holstered handgun is part of the
uniform, perhaps indicative of status but not a functional necessity. Their
psychological investment in the need to be armed is similar to that of many
civilians who feel just the same way.
Whether patrol officers need firearms to make arrests is worth examining.
There may be a good deal of exaggeration of such need, especially in suburbs,
towns, and villages with low rates of violent crime. Self-defense skills, moral
39. Il Arrington v. City of'Chicago, 45 III. 2d 316, 259 N.E.2d 22 (1970), tileIllinois Supreme
Court declared:
A peace oflicer is delined as 'any person who by virltue of his office or' public cliploynieni is
vesled by law witl a dlty to maintain public order or to make arrests for ollenses .... * lie has
[ihe
dily to inltitllil public order wherever lieinav Ie: his duties are not confined to a specific
Iile
and place as are those of a prison glard. i is ior this reason ati d not be ulse
o' pewe n/fr
ollr' moy
be .uidber] to al/rk, that lie is aillowed to carry weap
sOat allIinies,
Id.ill3 I8, 259 N.E.2d at 24 (emihasis added) (ciliall t olltted).
40. ()ther avent
l ic''rce alt available. Accorillg Io sociol gs
golil
I
Bil cr, "lticptolice
hav'e a 1Illolop)oly oin lbol-Ileg(otlle cCerciyve 1nco
w
emtployed itl ace) ldalue willi I ie dictales o' all
ililitiVe graspiofsi tlilioit l exigencies.' E.BItIrNIR. TItIeFUNCTIONN OF l It.t(:F
.C
IN MIII)FRN SOCIT1'
46 (Nat'l Inst. Me ll II etlh, Crilne and )elitnqlency Issues Monogiirapi Series No. 2059, 1970).

41. Se' (Geller & Karaltes. Sho//,lg o/ and by (b).bhicag'o,
Polier."
U w"lmrfln
Chicago Police, 72.J. (RIM.
. & CRIMINOI.C;v 1813. 1829 (1981).

(rises. Part 1: .i'hoo/i, 's by
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and legal authority, and availability of reinforcements might enable officers to
make arrests in most cases, even if they were not armed. Police effect most
arrests in Great Britain and Japan without the use of guns. 42 Even in large
American cities, police officers very rarely draw their guns, although
admittedly the visible presence of a gun might deter the kind of attacks that
would make it necessary to draw.
The relationship between being armed and being able to make an arrest is
hardly obvious. 43 Many jurisdictions and police departments sharply limit the

right to use deadly force to make an arrest. Some states follow the Model
Penal Code in authorizing the use of deadly force to arrest only when an
officer reasonably believes the suspect has committed a violent felony or
threatens death or serious bodily harm if the arrest is delayed. 44 Many police
departments go much further in restricting the use of deadly force. 4 5 In many
large cities an investigation is automatically called for any time deadly force is
used. 46 Increasingly, rules governing police use of deadly force prohibit the
use of firearms to make arrests in all but the most desperate situations. How
does being armed help in making an arrest? Will a suspect acquiesce in being
taken into custody if he knows that he could be shot if he tries to flee? In the
recent case of Tennessee v. Garner, the United States Supreme Court held
Tennessee's law permitting the police to shoot any fleeing felon to be
unconstitutional, reasoning that "[i]t is not better that all felony suspects die
than that none escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the
officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend
him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so." 4 7 Thus, a handgun will

not be of any use in a large number of arrest situations.
Undeniably, there are situations in which dangerous armed felons must be
apprehended who would not acquiesce without the threat of lethal force.
42. Police officers in Great Britain are not issued firearms as standard equipment. Fhey are
trained to use firearms, however, and police agencies have a wide variety of weapons at their
disposal. LAw LIBRARY, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, GUN CONTROL LAWS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 75-99
(1981). Although Japanese police carry firearms while they are on regular patrol duty, their weapons
are rarely used. D. BAYLEY, s upra note 31, at 162. Riot and undercover police do not carry guns, and
those officers who are armed on duty neither carry guns off duty nor take their guns home. Id.
Japanese police rarely need firearms because few private citizens own hrearms and the rate of armed
crime is very low. Id. at 168-69. Furthermore, Japanese police forces, unlike their American
counterparts, emphasize tactics and martial arts training. Id. at 163-64. Of course, the point of this
article is that, while it may be difficult to disentangle cause and effect on this issue, restricted police
use of firearms may contribute to lower rates of citizen use.
43. As the Supreme Court majority said in Tennessee v. Garner: "And while the meaningfil threat
of deadly force might be thought to lead to the arrest of more live suspects by discouraging escape
attempts, the presently available evidence does not support this thesis." 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1700-01
(1985).
44. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2) (1980).
45. See the extensive discussion of administrative regulations linuiting the police officer's right
to use deadly force to make an arrest in the Police Foundation's amicus brief in T'ennessee v. Garner,
105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985). See also Geller & Karales, supra note 37. at 372-73.
46. Geller & Karales, supra note 41, at 1829.
47. Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1701 (1985).
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Still, this type of situation does not justify arming all police all of the time. 48
Firearms could be assigned selectively, "as needed," to police officers
investigating serious offenses or violent offenders, or firearms might be
assigned routinely to patrols in certain dangerous neighborhoods or even to
all patrols in the largest cities. A police firearms policy that required a
showing of need before a firearm was issued would reflect a powerful societal
49
commitment to restrict the use of handguns.
Even if there is justification for drawing a bright line between possession
of handguns by the police and by the citizenry, does it extend to police
officers' right (or obligation) to carry weapons while off-duty?5- 1 Is a police
officer who is off duty and out of uniform sufficiently distinct from a private
citizen to justify allowing arms to the former but not the latter? The answer is
quite likely "yes." Off-duty police officers in plain clothes are authorized and
frequently required to make arrests when they observe the commission of a
crime. 5 1 There are obviously strong reasons to encourage this policy. It
does, however, represent a broad interpretation of the police firearm
exemption, and a large percentage of police shootings occur in off-duty
situations.52
A further option is the possibility of "de-arming." If it is granted that
police officers need handguns, what kind of guns and what kind of bullets are
required? Should police officers be "armed to the teeth" in order to
maximize the possibility of "neutralizing" any threat, or should they "make
do" with the least lethal weaponry they are likely to need? Police weaponry of
all kinds has apparently increased in caliber, destructiveness, and "stopping
power" over the last several decades. Like the international arms race, there
seems to be an inexorable drive to accumulate more powerful weaponry. An
issue the Supreme Court did not reach in Tennessee v. Garner5 3 is the
constitutionality of the "dum-dum" bullets used by the Memphis Police
48. Itmight also be argued that arrest authority cannot be used to distinguish the police officer
from the private citizen because private citizens do have authority (albeit not the obligation) to make
an arrest when a felony is committed in their presence. Citizen's arrest is exercised quite
infrequently in the United States, although particular categories of private citizens, like security
guards, do often detain criminal suspects. See M. BASSIOUNI, CITIZEN'S ARREST: THE LAW OF ARREST,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE FOR PRIVATE CITIZENS AND PRIVATE POLICE 23-26 (1977). The different arrest
authority of police and private citizens could serve to justify a police-only handgun exemption.
49. Sadly, the trend is not in the direction of disarming to the greatest feasible extent; rather, it
is in the opposite direction. The pressure is to purchase more powerful and lethal handguns and
other powerful firearms. Apparently, many police officers in larger cities regularly carry three
handguns, one in a side holster, one in an ankle holster, and one in their belt.
50. See POLICE FOUNDATION, POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE (1977); Fyfe, .llwavs Prepared: Police
Off-Duty Guns, 452 ANNALS 72 (1980). Although a Police Foundation survey reveals that 49% of
jurisdictions surveyed require that their officers be armed while off duty, 41.5% of off-duty weapons
discharges by New York City police from August 1972 to December 1975 resulted in some
administative or criminal sanction.
The courts have reinforced the notion that the police officer's role continues around the clockwhether on or off duty. See, e.g., People v. Weaver, 100 ill. App. 3d 512, 514, 426 N.E.2d 1227, 1229
(1981) (A peace officer's duty is "not confined to a specific time and place.").
51. People v. Weaver, 100 ill. App. 3d 512, 514, 426 N.E.2d 1227, 1229 (1981).
52. Geller & Karales, supra note 37, at 335.
53. 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985).
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Department. A comprehensive "gun control" program would aim to reduce
the destructive power of police weaponry as much as possible.
3. Deterring Crime. Some people might justify a police-only handgun
exemption on the ground that an armed police depresses crime by inhibiting
would-be criminals from violating the law. For the deterrence proposition to
be true, there would have to be potential offenders who would commit crimes
but for fear of being shot by the police or of being arrested by armed (but not
unarmed) police. It seems unlikely that the number of such potential
offenders is very large, but if it is, is it not also plausible that an armed
citizenry, or at least a partially armed citizenry, also serves to deter crime?
Potential offenders might fear being shot or arrested by armed civilians as
much as by armed police. Indeed, they might fear an armed citizenry more
54
because it is less identifiable and predictable.
4. Superior Training. It will surely occur to some readers that, due to
background and training, police officers handle firearms more carefully and
responsibly than private citizens. However, this assumption may not be as
justified as it might at first seem. Most police officers receive little entry-level
weapons training, especially in night firing, and annual requalification
requirements are rare. 5 5 Very few departments have the resources and
facilities to provide effective training in confrontational situations.
Unnecessary off-duty shooting and accidents are a significant problem, at least
in some departments. 56 Even if the police as a group are more competent than
private gun owners, however, it begs the question to base a weapons policy on
police officers' superior training since current public policy discourages
weapons training for civilians. If private citizens were willing to submit to the
same training as police, and to abide by the same rules (or even more
stringent ones) on the use of deadly force, could the police officer still claim
54. According to Kleck and Bordua, burglars and robbers fear homeowners with guns and iheir
fears are justified: "[P]rivate citizens seem to use guns (legally) to shoot criminals about as often as
police do." Kleck & Bordua, The Factual Fouidationfor Certain Ke.ssumptiouis of Gui Coitol. 5 LAw &
POL'Y Q. 271, 283 (1983).
55. Even in large cities, there is great variation in the quantity and quality of weapons iraining.
Sixty-six percent of officers on forces of cities with more than 50,000 residents do not have to qualilx
with the ammunition they use while on duty. Sixty-seven percent of the forces do not provide
training in night firing and 40% give no field instruction on when to fire. Teske & Niksich, Fireorms
Trainitgfor Law Enforcement Personnel, POLICE CHIEF, Oct. 1979, at 58, 60, 62. Night firing training is
particularly important because the majority of shootings occur at night. See Geller, Deadly Force: Il'hat
IWe Know, 10J. POLICE ScL &AD. 151, 158 (1982). Moreover, police in general have little incentive to
develop firearms skills.
Another measure of police officer training is police use of deadly force. Estimating the frequency
of unjustified deadly force is complicated by present recording procedures. See Sherman &
Langworthy, IeasuringHomicide by Police Officers, 70.J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 546 (1979) (discussing
various factors which tend to minimize the number of police homicides reported).
Several studies suggest that a high proportion of all police homicides are unjustified. See Geller.
supra, for a summary of most of the pre-1982 major studies on police homicide. In light of such
studies, it should not be assumed that police use handguns more safely and responsibly than private
citizens.
56. Geller & Karales, supra note 41, at 1838.
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to be more reliable in possessing and carrying a handgun than is the private
57
citizen in keeping a handgun at home?
As for judgment, reliability, and overall moral character, while a prior
felony conviction or mental illness disqualifies applicants for police jobs,
recruits must merely pass minimum scrutiny; in no sense are they chosen on
the basis of superlative psychological stability or moral character. After
joining the force, there are no further background checks and investigations
in most departments unless charges of corruption or abuse of force arise.
5. Summary. Should the police retain their handguns because the benefits
of crime prevention and control outweigh the costs of crimes committed and
accidents caused? If so, are the police the only subgroup for which costbenefit analysis would support gun possession? Other groups or individuals
would surely claim that their gun ownership provides a net benefit to
society-small shopowners, for example, might be able to show that as a class
they deter and thwart more harm with their weapons than they cause. If it is
accepted that police need powerful handguns (and dum-dum bullets) on an
around-the-clock basis, in all types of departments, and on all assignments, it
would not be surprising if large numbers of people concluded that they were
unsafe, that guns enhance personal security, and that, like the police, they
should be armed.
A plausible justification for a police exception to a general prohibition on
handguns could emphasize the arrest and order-maintenance responsibilities
of the police, and the sense of security an armed police provides for the whole
citizenry. If this justification were employed, it would be important not to
permit further exceptions lest the legitimacy of handgun prohibition itself be
underminded. The next section illustrates, however, that even handgun
prohibitionists now seem to accept the arming of other "peace officers" and
private security personnel.
C.

Defining "The Police"

Assuming that there is a strong justification for exempting the police from
a general handgun prohibition, which personnel in which departments
constitute "the police"? The state police agency, county sheriffs'
departments, and city police are obviously included within any definition
because they exercise comprehensive law enforcment authority within their
jurisdictions. Should the definition include university police, housing and
transit police, the investigatory personnel of agencies having authoritv over
57. See Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1014 (8th (Ci-. 1976). vr'oted mi olhr ,iomud s
m
wi .
Ashcrofi v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977). In aalis. [Iw Eighlh Cicuil noted (lat "lh l'rcsidcnl's
Commission Ion L.aw Enforcemcnt and le Adini nstralion I ol. slicc louid. Iro lgh its stltdies. I~it
'Ipjolice use of fircarms to a)lprchcnd stspcCis oflten strains o llltl il
ttcltiolls or vvcii restihs int
serious disturbances . . . When studied ol jectcivtely and uninolionlt i
'N,particular uses of lirearills
by police oflicers are often unwartanted.' " Id
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pollution control, liquor licensing, and protection of fish and wildlife, parole
58
and probation officers, prison guards, and court personnel?
1. University Police. Consider the university police, most of whom are now
armed . 5 9 In many states, they exercise police authority on their respective
campuses. 60 Many campus security forces carry out patrol functions in
marked squad cars. These departments may have emerged because of a
desire to keep the regular police off campuses in the riot and demonstrationfilled days of the 1960's, but they have since justified themselves as a
necessary counterforce to predatory crime. Over the years many
departments, even those of rural private universities, have armed their
personnel with handguns.
In support of their claim to remain armed, campus security forces could
emphasize their organizational, legal, and functional similarity to the public
police. The campus forces are organized according to the public police
model; they wear police uniforms and operate marked patrol cars, and their
top personnel typically are recruited from the ranks of law enforcement.
University police would oppose their disarmament on the ground that it
would undermine their capacity to protect their student communities.
College and university faculty, students, and staff might feel insecure without
armed protection, reflecting the belief that police without guns are simply not
"real police." If general jurisdiction police need handguns to protect their
constituents, so the argument goes, university police need guns to protect
theirs.
To fold campus security forces into the police exception is to take another
step toward loosening the moral force behind a handgun prohibition,
dooming any prospects of general disarmament. None of the reasons that
58. Many categories of public employees are considered peace officers. See. e.g., CA.L. PENAL.
CODE § 830.1 - .6 (West 1973); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 2.10 (McKinney 1983) (mlany olihese peace
oflicers must have licenses to carry firearms under § 400 of' the Penal Law). the Illinois deliniion.
s.upra notes 22-25 and accompanying text, includes a diverse group of[ personnel charged with law
enforcement.
59. See Jacobs & O'Meara, Securitv Forces md ihei,7)Tra.
rmabioii (/ the .COLLEGEt( n i 'ei/. ( Ol)l.t(;t
& U.. Spring 1980, at 283. A 1972 survey of 234 campus securit Fiwces indicaied (hat 155 of ihcni
issued firearms. Id. at 287 n. 15.
60. A 1972 survey of 234 campus security departmenis indicated thai II I exercised state
authority, 36 exercised county authority, and 46 exercised citN ait
huts.Id. at 285 n.8.
In California. for example, ('alifornia State Uniiversity and (ollege police are peace oflicers tindei
CAt.. PENAI. CODI: § 830.3(i) (West 1973). Their authority extends to ally place ii the st ale. att
entitles them to carry concealed firearms e\vei if they retire. CAL. P:NA.L Con.: § 12027 (Vest 1973).
Community college police are peace Onliccts tnder CAL,. PENAI. (OD.
§ 830.4 (West 1973). Their
jurisdiction is more limited, and their retired officers are not exeiiilp hroin the concealed lirteanias
statuile. Seciriiy ftirces liir private colleges and universities, alth ngh not c msideitc(l io hae l)cace
oflicer stans, nIlay be granteI powers of arrest if a nleimranl
1)1 li(ersii(liig is tiled wilh it
sherift or chief ofIpolice of tIle jurisdiction in which the instittini
is ltCald. C.L. PrNAi. C(OD
§ 830.7 (West Sttpp. 1983).
tniversity of Illinois police and Sotith(iii Illinois tltiversily police are tt'tc ollicers. hut ontly lor
Iurp)ses o" prolectlitg niiersity proci)erty or tither interets. Sersa
.,t
oic 24.
State tniversity of New York securily personnel are teactc ()tioccrs.
ti neced a ptItmi to ('atr\
firearms. N.Y. li.:xNAi. COi. § 400 (MNKinttey 1981): N.Y. CRINi. l'ittit:. l..
§ 2.10( II) (Mtkilttte
1981).
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support an exception for sworn public police are compelling when applied to
most college and university security forces. Self-defense is not a major
concern; there is no need to press forward with arrests; there is no special
need for an extraordinary deterrent capacity; and there is no reason to
consider the personnel of such agencies especially reliable handgun owners
and users. If campus police need guns around-the-clock, the general
citizenry, including many young people, will consciously or unconsciously
conclude that the social environment is dangerous practically everywhere, and
that guns are a means of insuring personal security. Widespread acceptance
of such a conclusion would doom the prospects of a gun prohibition program.
2. Other Criminal Justice Personnel. Consider the handgun claims of such
nonpolice personnel as probation and parole officers and prison guards.
They do not carry out a police function, although they typically perceive
themselves as working in law enforcement. 6 1 In many states, they have fought
hard, and frequently successfully, for the right to carry weapons on and, in
62
some cases, off duty.

Some prison and jail guards are permitted to possess and carry handguns
off duty;" 3 where this is not true, almost invariably there are efforts to secure
the privilege. For some officers, the right to carry a weapon may be a major
61.

Corrections, probation, and parole officers have peace officer status in some states. See, e.g.,
§ 830.5 (West 1973); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 2.10(23) - (25) (McKinnev 1981).
62. Such officers often resort to litigation when their departments seek to limit their guncarrying authority, or they may claim such authority as a defense to an illegal firearms charge. See,
e.g.. California State Employees' Ass'n v. Way, 135 Cal. App. 3d 1059, 185 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1982)
(Department of Youth Authority parole officers unsuccessful in bid to obtain firearms as safety
equipment); California State Employees' Ass'n v. Enomoto, 118 Cal. App. 3d 599, 173 Cal. Rptr. 517
(1981) (parole officers denied use of firearms); Arrington v. City of Chicago, 45 I1. 2d 316, 259
N.E.2d 22 (1970) (corrections officers' attempt to invalidate Chicago ordinance restricting carrying
of firearms to on-duty hours successful to extent ordinance conflicted with a newly amended statute
allowing possession of weapons while commuting to and from work); People v..James, 54 Ill. App. 2d
361. 204 N.E.2d 134 (1964) (Illinois corrections officer successful in quashing indictment relating to
his carrying of firearms while off duty: the legislature later amended § 24-2 of the Penal Code so that
corrections officers are exempt from concealed firearms statute only while on duty or while
commuting to and from work); Civil Serv. Employees' Ass'n v. Narcotic Addiction Control Comm'n,
45 A.D.2d 685, 356 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1976) (narcotic parole officers not entitled to carry firearms while
on duty); Salata v. Tolman, 38 A.D.2d 991, 329 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1972) (New York City probation
officers unsuccessful in overturning regulation barring on-duty firearms): Vasquez v. Connelie, 116
Misc. 2d 29, 455 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1982) (federal corrections officer not exempt from prosecution for
carrying firearm off duty); Figaro v. Ward, 86 Misc. 2d 530, 383 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1976) (corrections
officers unsuccessful in attempt to invalidate regulation restricting types of handguns which can be
carried while off duty); People v. Simmons, 85 Misc. 2d 623, 380 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1976) (narcotics
corrections officer indicted for carrying firearms); 64 Cal. Op. Att Gen. 859 (1981) (retired
corrections officers unsuccessful in attempt to obtain exemption from concealed firearms statute); 63
Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 385 (1980) (corrections officers successful in obtaining right to carry firearms off
duty, but Penal Code later amended to allow employing agencies to abridge this right): 1981 11. Op.
At'y Gen. 48 (probation officers are not peace officers and therefore have no right to carry firearms
while on duty).
63. See, e.g.. CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.5(b) (West 1970); ILIL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 24-2(a)(2)
(Smith-Hurd 1977); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 2.10(25) (McKinney 1981); N.Y. PENAi IA.W
§ 400.00(2)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1984).
CAL. PENAL CODE
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attraction of their job. Yet prison personnel have no special arrest powers.6
If asked to explain why they should be privileged to carry concealed
handguns, most jail officers" 5 as well as probation and parole officers, would
probably say that they are more likely than the average person to be
victimized by ex-inmates harboring grudges against them."" This argument
sounds like the concern for personal safety and security shared by many
private citizens.
Presumably, the same notion of special vulnerability to attack underlies
laws which allow some court officials to carry or possess firearms. California
marshals and deputy marshals of a municipal court, as well as constables and
deputy constables of a judicial district, have peace officer status and can carry
concealed firearms, even after they retire.67 In New York, peace officer status is
conferred upon uniformed court officers of the unified court system, court
clerks of the unified court system in the first and second departments, the
marshal, deputy marshal, clerk or uniformed court officer of a district court,
and marshals or deputy marshals of a city court. 6 8 Only the marshals and
deputy court marshals of a city court must obtain a license to carry a
handgun. 69 Judges of New York City's civil and criminal courts and justices of
the supreme court in the first and second departments may obtain a special
license to carry a handgun. 70 Until recently, even court clerks and court
reporters had authority to carry concealed firearms, 7 ' apparently to protect
72
the judges.

64. Illinois corrections officers are not considered peace officers. See Arrington v. City of
2d 316, 318, 259 N.E.2d 22, 24 (1970). California guards are peace officers, but their
Chicago, 45 Ill.
powers are only "for the purpose of carrying out the primary function of their employment or as
required under Sections 8597, 8598, and 8617 of the Government Code (states of emergency)."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.5 (West Supp. 1984). New York corrections officers are considered peace
officers under N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 2.10(25) (McKinney 1981).
65. But see Arrington v. City of Chicago, 45 Il.2d 316, 259 N.E.2d 22 (1970). The court in
Arnington held that self-protection is an insufficient justification for giving prison guards the right to
carry guns at all times: "Although they may feel that they need to carry weapons for self-protection.
they are no different in this respect from many other public officials." Id. at 318, 259 N.E.2d at 24.
66. In both California State Employees' Ass'n v. Enomoto, 118 Cal. App. 3d 599. 173 Cal. Rptr.
517 (1981), and California State Employees' Ass'n v. Way, 135 Cal. App. 3d 1059, 185 Cal. Rptr. 747
(1982), parole agents claimed that handguns were needed to ensure their personal safety. See su/nm
note 62. The plaintiffs in 1laV relied on several incidents of parolees shooting at parole officers. 135
Cal. App. 3d at 1066, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
67.

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.1 (West 1970); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12027 (Vest

1982).

68. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 2.10(21)(a) - (d) (1981).
69. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 2.10(21)(d) (1981).
70. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1983) ("A license for a pistol or revolver
shall be issued to . . . have and carry concealed by a justice of the supreme court in the first or
second judicial departments or by a judge of the New York city civil court or the New York city
criminal court .... ").
71. Court clerks are considered peace officers under N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 2.10(21)(b)
(McKinney 1981); court reporters were given the same privilege in Association of Surrogates &
Supreme Court Reporters v. Evans, 102 Misc. 2d 883, 424 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1979). The legislature
eliminated the court reporters' right to carry handguns. Compare N.Y. CRUM1. PROC. L'w § 2.10(21)
(McKinney 1981) (and accompanying text) with N.Y. CRtM. PROC. LAw § 1.20(33)(d) - (g) (1977).
72. Although the court in Association of Surrogates & Supreme Court Reporters v. Evans. 102
Misc. 2d 883, 424 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1979), considered the point to be "mere speculation," the
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No good justification for exempting these groups-and not scores of
others-is apparent. Court clerks, court reporters, and judges have no special
peacekeeping function 71" or special handgun expertise; their handguns are as
vulnerable to misuse or theft as those of other people. Other criminal justice
system personnel, such as prosecutors, jurors, and witnesses, do not enjoy
whatever security armed self-protection may afford, although they may be just
74
as vulnerable.

If special vulnerability to victimization justifies exemption from a handgun
prohibition, there are many subgroups and countless individuals whose claims
would be stronger than those of prison guards, probation and parole officers,
and judges and court personnel. Similarly, if the crucial justificatory criterion
is special reliability, there are numerous groups and countless individuals
whose claim is as strong. As the police exception expands to embrace all sorts
of public officials, more private citizens will doubt the equity of the
prohibition. Moreover, a handgun prohibition which leaves large numbers of
government employees armed will be anathema to those people who tend to
distrust government and governmental elites.
D.

The Private Police

The expansionist tendency of the peace officer exception becomes even
more apparent when the status of private security personnel is examined.
The private security sector has grown substantially since the early 1960's.
There are approximately one million crime-related security workers in the
United States, filling such diverse roles as private investigators, watchmen,
and neighborhood and community patrols. 75 They guard factories, utilities,
banks, stadiums, department stores, shopping centers, office complexes,
respondents' brief argued that the law clerk was the judge's only source of protection within
chambers or while in transit to the courtroom. Id. at 885-6, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
73. Association of Surrogates & Supreme Court Reporters v.Evans, 102 Misc. 2d 883, 885, 424
N.Y.S.2d 818, 820 (1979). As the court in Evans stated:
There is nothing in the job definitions or in the record to show that law clerks are involved with
peacekeeping duties any more so than court reporters. There is some attempt in the affidavits
annexed to the respondents' answer to attribute security or peacekeeping duties to law clerks
but it is not substantiated by the record.
Id.
74. Indeed, it is likely that witnesses are much more vulnerable.
75. In their updated version of the 1971 Rand Corporation study of the private security
industry, Kakalik and Wildhorn found that there were 1.1 million crime-related security workers in
this country in the early 1970's. Of these, 429,000 were privately employed and 113,000 were
government-employed guards and watchmen. The number of private police and detectives remained
constant through the 1960's, while the number of guards and watchmen grew by one-third. J.
KAKALIK & S. WILDHORN, THE PRIVATE POLICE: SECURIrY ANi) DANGER 17-18 (1977).
The Task Force on Private Security found that the average annual growth rate of security goods
and services through the early 1970's was between 10% and 12% and that the total number of
security employees employed by American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) members was
880,000 in 1975. The task force also estimated that the number of ASIS security employees reached
one million in 1976. TASK FORCE ON PRIVATE SECURITY, PRIVATE SECURITY 35, 399-400 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCEI.
In 1975, studies found that private security personnel outnumbered local police in St. Louis. New
Orleans, and Cleveland (Cuvahoga County). Id. at 35T . BRENHNN. lI OTIER POiXcE (1975)
(Cuyahoga County study).
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retirement communities, apartment buildings, and scores of other facilities.
Their very existence shows that federal, state, and local governments fail to
7
meet society's demand for security services. "
A Rand Corporation study conducted in the mid-1970's found that
approximately fifty percent of private security personnel carry a firearm while
on duty. 7 7 At the time, this amounted to approximately 200,000 people.
Presumably, most guards carry their firearms to and from work as well. To
determine whether a general handgun prohibition should exempt private
security personnel, their role and status must be examined.
The San Francisco and Morton Grove handgun control laws carve out
broad exceptions for security guards despite their lack of training and
reliability. Why? In searching for an explanation, it is important
to recognize
private security's vital place in the law enforcement sector. 78 By permitting
and perhaps encouraging business organizations, groups, and individuals to
purchase their own security services, the public police have been able to
concentrate their resources elsewhere and local governments have avoided
massive additional costs. Arguably, disarming the private half of the security
sector would unhinge the internal security system developed over the past
several decades and decrease the effectiveness of private security forces vis-avis the public police.
76. SeeJ. KAKAtIK & S. W1LDHORN, supra note 75, at 90 ("With few exceptions, guards perform
work that the regular public police cannot perform because of legal constraints or because of
resource limitations."). Kakalik and Wildhorn attribute the growth of the private security industry
to:
(1) the high level or rate ofand increase in reported crime in all regions:
(2) increasing public awareness and fear of crime;
(3) the government's need for security for its space and defense activities during the past
decade and, more recently, for security against violent demonstrations, bombings, and
hijackings;
(4) a basic trend toward specialization of all services;
(5) withdrawal of some insurers from the market;
(6) insurers raising rates and/or requiring use of certain private security systems;
(7) insurers offering premium discounts when certain private security measures are used;
(8) the growth of the electronics industry and advances in other scientific areas, which have
sparked new branches of several protection companies. manutacturing greatly improved security
devices, especially for intrusion detection: and
(9) a general increase in corporate and private income leading to more property to protect
and, ill the saime time, more income to pay For protection.
/d. at 19.
77. An employee survey revealed that 48% of respondents carried firearms at least one-quarter
of the time, while 40% carried them all the time. J. KAKAI.JK & S. WILDHORN. supra note 75. at 189.
Similarly, a 1975 ASIS survey fotnd that 45% of uni foined pers 311ll are arileCd and that 30% of
n(untlif( irilred persomnel arC armed. TASK lIFoRCE.s /no ote 75, at 342.
78. AIthough privaite security perso linel oft en have n13 crinie-related ftctions, such as fire and
equipment Fiilure dleclion and conlrolling access Io privale property, all guards have certain
responsibilities related to law enfIorcelenl. ,1. KA KA.IK & S. ViI 1KnN. Supra uo(,le 75, a(t 90.
The major dislilo ion beweei publlic police and privale security personnel is thai the public
police are responsible lin mainltaining public order, while priviate sectilitv forces protecl private
I ri'periy . IASK FOR :i. spnor uoe 75. at 5-6. 20-2 1. Ka kalik and Wildhorn suggest that. (fite to their
(lifle'rilng jtlris(diciiolns, public police functions are primarily investigative and arrest oriented. while
Ite privale police coucenlrale oil crillie prevenlioll and detection. 1. KAKAIIK & S. WII,)IIORN. .llp/ff
note 75. at 88-89. While this distilclion calpturts a certain reality. Ille public police obviously pay a
good deal of alleulion 1'rmine
to
pret.,uion, order ullainlenaluce. and deterre ce.
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Just as it is a mistake to lump all police and police departments together, it
would be a mistake to treat all private security guards and functions alike. A
great deal of private security could very likely be (and often is) performed by
unarmed guards. Other security functions have a more compelling need for
armed protection. Banks, utilities, nuclear power plants, valuable art
museums, and warehouses are highly vulnerable targets for professional and
even amateur criminals, as well as terrorists. The appearance of less welldefended targets might increase these businesses' vulnerability to terrorism
and violent crime. Thus, it makes sense to treat private security exceptions to
handgun prohibition on a case-by-case basis. There does not seem to be a
persuasive justification for exempting all or most security guards from a
general gun prohibition. If all private security guards were permitted to be
armed with handguns on the ground that it is necessary to protect important
and vulnerable interests, a general disarmament policy would be in shambles,
for there is no bright line between the private security guard and the private
79
citizen concerned about the safety of his or her person, home, or business.
Little, if anything, distinguishes a store owner possessing a handgun from a
private security guard. In effect, the store owner serves as his own security
guard.
The private citizen has no general arrest powers; neither does the security
guard.8 0 The private citizen has no professional law enforcement expertise;
neither does the private security guard who, on the same day, can be hired,
given a handgun, and put on thejob.8 l If anything, the private security guard
79. A California poll on handgun ownership found that 64% of handgun owners in southern
California and 41% in northern California owned handguns for self-protection. BUREAU OF
CRIMINAL STAISTICS, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A SYNOPSIS OF A CALIFORNIA POLL OF
HANDGUN OWNERSHIP AND USE 1 (1977), quoted in Hardy, Firearm Ownership and Regidation: Tacklingan
ONd Pioblem wilh Renewed Vigol, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235, 243 n.35 (1978).
80. Unless the private security officer is deputized or has specific powers delineated by statute,
his arrest powers are no greater than those of the private citizen. J. KAKALIK & S. WILDHORN, supra
note 75. at 213: TASK FORCE, supra note 75, at 391; Ne-wby, Gnard Regilalion, in SECURITY
MAN AGEMENT. May 1981, at 30, 36.
81. A 1975 survey of state regulatory agencies and attorneys general found that only seven
states required any firearms training for security employees. TASK FORCE, snpra note 75, at 386-87.
This record (lid not improve significantly over the next six years. In 1981, only a small minority of
states required firearms training for armed security guards. Newby, snpra note 80, at 36. "Very few
state statutes spell out training requirements, and those that do generally only designate certain
subjects that must be covered." Id. Municipalities sometimes have more detailed training
requirements.
The result of this indilference is that few guards are trained at all, and very few are trained
adequately. An employee study conducted by the United Plant Guard Workers of America (UPGWA)
indicated that although almost half of the guards surveyed were armed while working, less than onefilth had received any firearms training. A survey of plants with in-house security departments
indicated that. while 29% of the guards are armed, only eight percent of the plants offer any' firearms
training. J. KAKALIK & S. V¥iLDiiORN, si/pin note 75, at 122. Thus, many new security guards are
aiied and immediately placed on assignment.
Yraining for other job-related duties is equally deficient: "The training a private guard receives
before beginning work lasts typically no more than 8 to 12 hours, and many guards, including some
who are armed, receive less than two hours of training." Sixty-six percent of the guards surveyed
received no training. 1i.at 121. Even those who claim that private security forces are becoming
increasingly profcssionalized point out the necessity of more training for more guards. The result of
this lack of training is potentially disastrous. On a written questionnaire which tested guards' ability
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may be more likely than the average citizen to have a criminal record.
Background security checks often take months to complete, if they are
completed at all.8 2 The private security companies characteristically pay low
wages and tolerate high turnover.8 13 It would be unrealistic to characterize the
8' 4
typical private security guard as well-trained or particularly "responsible.
Is there sound justification for a policy that entitles a large retail liquor
store to protect itself with an armed Brinks guard or with one of its own
specially designated armed security employees, but forbids the owner of the
nearby "Ma and Pa" store to have his own gun? If the owner of the corner
store were sufficiently affluent, he could hire a security guard to provide
armed protection.8 5 If he is denied the prerogative of functioning as his own
armed guard, he may perceive himself to be the victim of blatant class and
wealth discrimination.
E.

Who Are the Private Police?

If all private security personnel were exempted from a general firearms
prohibition, some government agencies would be faced with defining who is a
security guard. What would prevent anyone from calling himself or herself a
private security guard in order to obtain exemption from the handgun
prohibition?" What prevents any group of people from starting a private
security firm to protect their neighborhood, shopping center, or subway
system?
to handle certain employment-related situations, 97% of those surveyed made at least one error that
could have led to a lawsuit or to criminal charges. Id. at 179-81.
82. Adequate investigation of applicants for security jobs is hampered b%:
(1) the amount of time available for the screening process, from the time of application to
the time the employee is scheduled to start work;
(2) the amount of funds an employer can economically allocate for the screening process:
and
(3) the availability of the needed information.
-TASK FORCE, sipra note 75, at 71. Fingerprint searches alone can take up to nine months in some
states. Id. at 72. The conscientious employer may find it impossible to obtain accurate information
on whethei the new employee is fit for the job.
Many states attempt to regulate hiring practices. However, the flexibility of standards and the
inabilit of state agencies to enforce them hamper efforts to mandate adequate screening.
83. Commentators point to poor wages and benefits as the major reason foi low-qiiality
personnel. J. KAKAIK & S. \VII.DHORN. supra note 75, at 101; TASK FORCE, supra note 75. at 67-68.
Indicative of the problems created by inadequate compensation is the high turnover rate at many
security firms. Annual turnover rates in 1970 were estimated to range from less than 10% in some
in-house agencies (where wages and benefits are usually better) to more than 200%o at sonme contract
agencies. J. KAKAI.IK & S. WII.t)HORN. St)ra note 75, at 102. A 1980 California estimate placed
turnover at over 300%. San Francisco Examiner, Aug. 26, 1980, at l, col. 2.
84. Cases of criminality by private security guards or former private security guards are
common. For example, the "McDonald's murderer" in San Ysidro, California. during the summer of
1984 was a former private security guard. MACI.EAN's MAG., July 30, 1984, at 23, 23.
85. See ( "rban.MlerrhatsFind Gons IVi/al. and osl Poice Utids .Vow .gree. N.Y. Times.,July 20. 1974.
at 39. col. I.
86. As of 1980, about three-quarters of the states imposed licensing requirements oi private
Io
security agencies. Many municipalities in nonregulating states also impose requirements.
summarize:
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The private security sector is divided about equally between contract
guards and in-house guards 7 although there are also a small number of
private detectives and high-tech security specialists. Contract guards are
hired, outfitted, and sometimes trained by companies selling security services
to businesses, organizations, and individuals. In-house guards are designated
security personnel working for an employer whose main business is
something other than security. Generally, there is no regulation of in-house
security operations and only limited regulation of contract security
companies. 88 Payment of a license fee and filing a security bond are usually
sufficient to begin operating as a private security firm. There are few, if any,
restrictions on the recruitment of individual security guards.' (1) Thirty-three of the licensing states require a surety bond, which could range from
$2,000 to $300,000;
(2) twelve states require examinations;
(3) most states require a minimum of two years' experience in public or private security;
(4) thirty-seven states require high moral character;
(5) sixteen states require that agency chiefs be United States citizens;
(6) all thirty-seven states in the survey (nonregulating states plus Ohio and Arkansas were
left out of this section of the survey) required that chiefs have no prior felony convictions;
(7) thirty of these require no criminal records;
(8) all require fingerprinting.
See Summary of Slate Legislation Affecting Pivale Security, SECURITY MANAGEMENT, Apr. 1980, at 54, 54-59.
Even in licensing states, not all types of security agencies are subject to licensure. In fact, some states
exclude in-house guards and guard patrol agencies from licensing. SeeJ. KAKALIK & S. WILDHORN,
s51pra note 75, at 152.
87. In-house police and detectives, guards, and watchmen totalled 225,000 in 1972; contract
police and detectives, guards, and watchmen numbered 176,000, while an additional 28,000 were
employed by armored car services and alarm services. J. KAKA.IK & S. WIlt.DtORN, supra note 75, at
18.
88. State or local regulation of the private security industry consists of licensing of agencies and
registration of employees. In-house security personnel are hardly ever subject to such requirements.
Note, Reality avd Illusion: Deiting Private Securily Law in Ohio, 13 U. To.. L. REV. 377, 384 (1982).
For examples of state law on in-house security operations, see CAl.. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7522(a)
(West 1975) (in-house guards who carry firearms must complete a training course, but security
personiel who work for one employer and who do not carry weapons do not have to be registered);
Iii.. ANN. S'rAr. ch. Ill, § 2602 (Smith-Hurd 1978) (in-house employees are not subject to
registration statutes, but in-house guards must complete a training course to carry a concealed
lirearii under ch. 38, §§ 70-71, 81). The Illinois statute only regulates those btsinesses and their
employees doing business with the public; therefore, in-house operations are not affected. Ill. Op.
Att'y Gen., 21 )epl. Rep. 495 (1979).
89. Most states require some iortn
of registration or licensing for full-time employees, but only
II states specilically require part-tiiie employees to be registered. Sumnia-y o'Stale leg'islatioii
.'I[]'cling
I'rirate Security. supra
/
note 86, at 54-55. Since part-time employees account for ip to 50% f the staff
at some security agetcies, J. KAKAI.K & S. Wi.DIIORN. 1/no noite
i
75, at 102, a significant proportion
of security personnel remain otlside the regulatory sructure, even in those states that require
registration or licensing.
Where eiiployees nitust be registered or licensed, the requirements are far fiotm demanding.
)ptimally. sectrily employmnii t tlequi'irenlet s should screen out those "who are dishonest. C(l'rnpl,
lazy, or ecnolionallv or IIivs icallyi nstable.'" TAsK FORCE, su/a tiote 75, at 71. However, tire
requirelietlts do lille iic ilhan provide a check against hiring (oiviclcd felons. For example, Ohio
regulalious -'are inerely designed to screen oll coinvicted Ielns. rint those who Inay he unstitable
for security work for olier reasols." Note, slra hote 88. at 38). For exaniplles of' eiiplcee
qtalificatio statues. see, Ii.i.. ANN. ST'r. oh1.I I I, § 2622 (Snitlh-lurd 1978) (an employee canotl
have been coliviclcd of, a lt' lnv or iher oflense iivolving moral [tu'pilide witlhi
10 years of'
application and mlust he both ;tI.S.
a
citizen and at least 21 years of age): N.Y. (;:N. Btrs. LA,,w§ 81
(McKiney 1968) (Einploees must rit have beet coinvictc if a lia'lonv oi such iiisdetieiallirs as
firearns violation, possession of btrglar's tools. or tUilawlil elntry. alhough Illose who received
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At best, it is very difficult for a licensing agency, with limited staff, to
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate private security firms.!-", If any
person or persons could avoid the handgun prohibition by forming a security
firm, there would be a gaping loophole in the handgun prohibition net. A
nation serious about gun control would have to find a way to limit the use of
handguns by private security guards. While it will not be possible or desirable
to deny guns to guards protecting such highly vulnerable and publicly
significant targets as nuclear power plants and banks, the presumption should
be against licensing private security guards to carry handguns.
F.

The Citizenry

What justification is there for exempting business persons from the
prohibitory norm? Handgun prohibition would mean only that nonbusiness
citizens are unable to possess weapons. Would this be a reasonable place to
draw the line? Why should the protection of business property be a higher
priority than the protection of residential and personal property?
Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish or disentangle the commercial and
residential roles of private persons. Some people use their residences for
business purposes. Would they, therefore, be privileged to possess
handguns? The lower floors of some apartment buildings are utilized for
commercial purposes. Would tenants on the upper floors be denied weapons
permitted the business enterprises' employees on the lower floors?
Conversely, would upper floor residents enjoy the privilege of possessing
executive pardons or a certification of good conduct from the parole board are excepted. Employees
must be U.S. citizens or resident aliens, and may have to meet further criteria if required by the
licensing authority.). Even statutes which disqualify only convicted felons may be invalid under the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Compare Schanuel v. Anderson, 546 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.
Ill. 1982), afl-d, 708 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1983) (Illinois law prohibiting employment of convicted felon
for 10 years following conviction held valid) with Smith v. Fussenich, 440 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Conn.
1977) (automatic disqualification of applicants with prior felony convictions held to violate the equal
protection clause).
Even where administrators are permitted to disqualify employee-applicants for other reasons,
they are often unable to do so. Enforcement of private security regulations is usually entrusted to
agencies with little capacity for investigation. SeeJ. KAKALIK & S. WILDHORN, supra note 75, at 152.
Furthermore, because of the expense, even "well-meaning" firms cannot conduct thorough
investigations. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
The results of hiring inadequately screened personnel can be tragic. See, e.g.. One Big SecuritY Risk
Is the Secuirity Guards, Some Companies Find, Wall Street J., Aug. 30, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
90. Poorly staffed regulatory agencies face enormous enforcement problems. As of 1975, very
few states had more than 10 employees responsible for enforcing private security regulations.
California, which is one of the best-staffed states, had 10 employees to investigate 1,633 license
applicants and 95,000 registered employees. At best, only cursory attention can be paid to
confirming background information, investigating licensees' wrongdoing, and detecting illegal.
unlicensed operations.
Although the quality of enforcement against both agencies and individual employees is
improving, see J. KAKALIK & S. WILDHORN, supra note 75, at 151-67, regulatory bodies still face
awesome obstacles. For example, Ohio's Licensing Division had made great strides. Abuses such as
licensing convicted felons as agency heads and doctoring the scores of required examinations were
curtailed. In addition, several agencies were suspended for failure to register their employees.
Nonetheless, the license revocation power has rarely been invoked and the Licensing Division has
not succeeded in screening out all of the potentially unfit applicants. Note, supra note 88, at 388-90.
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firearms, the protection of the armed employees of the business enterprises
on the lower floors, or both, while residents in the building next door are
forbidden to own firearms?
Consider a retirement community which boasts a private security force
whose duties include checking cars entering the compound through a single
access road, conducting patrols, and maintaining surveillance of individual
homes. Must such a community disarm its private security force? If not, is
there justification for allowing this community's security force to remain
armed while forbidding those who live in modest homes in nearby towns to
possess guns?
Handgun control advocates no doubt will remain unconvinced. They can
be expected to support any limitation on gun possession as a move away from
a system of near universal handgun eligibility toward a system of general
prohibition, even one replete with gaping exceptions. The usefulness of such
regulation is doubtful, however. Prohibition with gaping exceptions would
legitimize a great deal of handgun ownership and thus fail to create an
environment conducive to massive voluntary surrender of firearms or to
cooperation with the disarmament program. In addition, it would generate
intense and dysfunctional conflict, litigation, and politicking as various groups
and interests struggle to obtain their own exceptions or fit themselves within
existing ones.
IV
CONCLUSION:

THE POLICE AND PRIVATE SECURITY EXEMPTIONS

RECONSIDERED

Men and women desire to possess handguns for many reasons, including
safety, security, and self-defense. 9' Many have "learned," from the example
set by police, peace officers, and the private security sector (reinforced by the
media), that firearms are "necessary" for personal security. The personnel of
such agencies may be so accustomed to their handguns that they find
alternative weapons and protective devices unimaginable. This attitude may
be a major stumbling block to formulating a coherent and successful firearms
policy. If the police feel handguns are absolutely necessary, especially for
self-defense, and if they refuse to accept the risks that might be entailed in
disarmament or de-armament, all sorts of other groups and individuals will
inevitably take the same position. Police leadership on the issue of gun
91.
A 1975 national survey found that for 55 percent of all gun owners, self defense was at least
one of the reasons the' owned a gun ....
In two national surveys conducted in 1978, 21 percent
and 25 percent of all gun owners said self defense was the most important reason they owned a
gun. Among the handgun owners, 45 percent owned their guns for this reason. A 1977 survev of
Illinois residents indicated that among persons who owned only handguns, 57 percent owned
them exclusively for protection, while another 10 percent indicated protection was their main
purpose. In a Florida survey, 54.5 percent of handgun owners said protection was their primary
purpose for purchasing the gun. Similar results were obtained in a survey of California handgun
owners.
Kleck & Bordua, The Assumptions of Gun Control, in FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE, supra note 29. at 31
(emphasis in original).
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control does not guarantee shrinkage of the arms pool, but without police
leadership, further arms proliferation and escalation seems inevitable.
For law enforcement personnel who are not police officers, the right to
carry handguns may symbolize status equivalence, societal respect, and
professionalism. Private police perform functions fairly similar to those of
police. They present a serious dilemma for would-be handgun
prohibitionists. It would be extremely difficult for society to have it both
ways-relying on private police to shoulder a large share of the law
enforcement load, but treating private security personnel as mere private
citizens when it comes to firearms policy. If policymakers acknowledge the
value of handguns for self-defense and crime prevention by allowing private
security personnel to carry handguns, however, the moral coherence of
handgun prohibition is seriously, perhaps fatally, weakened. Large numbers
of private citizens remain unshakably convinced that they need handguns in
their stores and in their homes to deter or thwart criminal predators.
The San Francisco and Morton Grove ordinances demonstrate that even
"radical" gun control legislation is far from a total prohibition. Just to draft
ordinances of this kind forces lawmakers to judge the relative merits of
various groups' and individuals' asserted needs to own handguns. These
judgments in turn require a coherent firearms philosophy which,
unfortunately, does not exist. The risk is a system of stringent gun control
riddled with so many categorical and ad hoc exceptions that it legitimates
almost as many guns as the current policy of universal access, except for
particular untrustworthy groups. A prohibition like that is not worth much; it
would lack the legitimacy necessary to convince gun owners to disarm and
92
potential gun buyers to change their minds.
A handgun prohibition must be symbolically right as well as politically
expedient. A prohibition that accommodates the concerns and influences of
all kinds of powerful interests will not be worth the paper on which it is
printed. More than legislation is needed to reverse the internal arms race. A
disarmament climate must be created, and that can best (perhaps only) be
accomplished through police leadership and example. The best strategy
toward handgun disarmament may not be to chip away at peripheral owners,
but to change the attitudes, values, and practices of the core ownership
group-the police, other law enforcement personnel, and private security
forces.
There is no "solution" to the problem of gun violence in the United
States. Even if disarming and de-arming the police could help to change
public perceptions about the necessity of owning and carrying firearms,
thereby shrinking the overall civilian stockpile of weapons, only some of the
92. Paul Aaron and David Husto point out that national prohibition was not a complete ban oil
the manufacture, sale, and purchase of alcoholic beverages. There were many exceptions (hat made
enforcement difficult and evasion much easier. Aaron & Husto, Temperance and Prohibition in America:
A Histwical Overview, in ALCOHOL AND PUBLIC POLICY:

Moore & D. Gerstein eds. 1981).
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gun prohibitionists' goals would be fulfilled. With fewer firearms in civilian
hands there might be fewer gun accidents, suicides, and fatal "crimes of
passion," although even these effects are by no means assured.
The cost might be to make the police and private citizenry more
vulnerable to violent criminals. It is implausible, at least in the short run, that
changing the gun environment would convince young street criminals or
hardened professional criminals to give up their weapons. Indeed, they might
become more brazen. But perhaps here, too, police commitment to minimal
gun use would have positive social and political ramifications. The use of a
gun in committing a crime might come to be seen as an extraordinarily
serious matter justifying an extraordinarily long prison term. 93 Perhaps over
time there would be fewer gun crimes, but only perhaps.
One comes back again and again to the dilemma of gun control: how to
reduce the negative consequences of firearms without placing undue risks on
innocent people. I cannot help but think that we would all be more secure,
and that we would have a better society, if the number of firearms could be
reduced. I am not impressed with the argument that greater security can be
obtained by the opposite policy, permitting and even encouraging more and
more civilian firearm ownership and use (of ever more powerful weapons),
just as I am not convinced that the international arms race can produce
greater security among the world's superpowers. But, to be sure, gun control,
like a nuclear freeze, is a serious risk. We would not be better off domestically
or internationally if only "our side" disarms. Gun control would, in my
judgment, only be desirable if it led over time to fewer armed crimes. Perhaps
this argues for a long-term effort at suppressing violent crime on the one hand
and assuring the personal safety and security of the general population on the
other hand. Providing the law-abiding citizenry with some self-defense
alternatives to guns should be a top priority.
The best that can be hoped for is slowly to change societal attitudes about
the necessity and usefulness of guns. This change cannot be accomplished
without strong leadership from the police and the elite sectors of society. As
long as the police, who are so visible, operate under the assumption that
firearms are essential for their safety and security, there is no prospect for
substantial reduction in civilian armaments. 9 4 The rest of the population will
take its cue from the police and the private security sector, reinforcing its
belief that firearms are essential to personal and household security.

93. See supra note 31.
94. Consider the following:
The Los Angeles Police Department is testing several types of semiautomatic pistols with more
than double the firepower of the .38-caliber revolvers now in tse at the department. The
department is becoming "more and more outgunned every day" in comparison to heavily armed
criminals, a spolesman said; thus it is testing possible replacements for the standard revolver
currently issued to officers.
Crim. Just. Newsletter, Jan. 16, 1986, at 7, col. 2.

